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Abstract
We propose a new composable and information-theoretically secure protocol to verify
that a server has the power to sample from a sub-universal quantum machine imple-
menting only commuting gates. By allowing the client to manipulate single qubits,
we exploit properties of Measurement based Blind Quantum Computing to prove se-
curity against a malicious Server and therefore certify quantum supremacy without
the need for a universal quantum computer.
1 Introduction
Quantum computers are believed to be efficient for simulating quantum systems [1, 2]
and have been shown to have many other applications [3]. Protocols demonstrating the
power of quantum computers include Shor’s algorithm for prime factorisation [4], Grover’s
algorithm for unstructured search [5], and the BB84 protocol for public key exchange [6].
That said, it may be some time before a large scale universal quantum computer
capable of demonstrating the computational power of these protocols is built. In the
meantime several intermediate, non-universal models of quantum computation, like the
one clean qubit model [7, 8] and the boson sampling model [9], have been developed and
may prove easier to implement. The Instantaneous Quantum Poly-time (IQP) machine
[10] is another such non-universal model with significant practical advantages [11, 12]. In
spite of the fact that IQP uses only commuting gates (in contrast to the non-commuting
gate set needed for universal computations), it is believed to remain hard to classically
simulate [13, 14] even in a noisy environment [15]. Hence, providing evidence that a
machine can perform hard IQP computations would be a proof of its quantum supremacy.
In [10], the authors present a hypothesis test that can be passed only by devices
capable of efficiently simulating IQP machines, providing the aforementioned evidence
of the capability to perform hard IQP computations. The client in that work is purely
classical, however computational assumptions (conjecturing the hardness of finding hidden
sub-matroids) were required for the security of the test against a malicious server. In
the present work, by providing a suitable implementation of the IQP machine in the
setting of Measurement Based Quantum Computing (MBQC) [16, 17], we are able to use
tools from quantum cryptography (e.g. blind quantum computing [18, 19]) to develop
an information-theoretically secure hypothesis test. To do so, we need to empower the
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client with minimal quantum capabilities such as those required in standard Quantum
Key Distribution schemes.
The structure of this work is as follows. In Section 2, we formally introduce the IQP
machine and develop an implementation of it in MBQC that is more suitable for our
blind delegated setting than previous ones [10, 20]. In Section 3 we derive a delegated
protocol for IQP computations that keeps the details of the computation hidden from the
device performing it, and prove information-theoretic security in a composable framework.
Finally in Section 4 we develop our hypothesis test for quantum supremacy, which a
limited quantum client can run on an untrusted Server.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 X-programs
The IQP machine introduced in [10], is defined by its capacity to implement X-programs.
Definition 2.1. An X-program consists of a Hamiltonian comprised of a sum of products
of X operators on different qubits, and θ ∈ [0, 2pi] describing the action for which it is
applied. The i-th term of the sum has a corresponding vector qi, called a program element,
which defines on which of the np input qubits, the product of X operators, which constitute
that term, act. qi has 1 in the j-th position when X is applied on the j-th qubit.
As such, we can describe the X-program using θ and a poly-size list of na vectors
qi ∈ {0, 1}np or, if we consider the matrix Q which has as rows the program elements
qi, i = 1, . . . , na, simply by the pair (Q, θ) ∈ {0, 1}na×np × [0, 2pi].
Applying the X-program discussed above to the computational basis state |0np〉 and
measuring the result in the computational basis allows us to see an X-program as a
quantum circuit with input |0np〉, comprised of gates diagonal in the Pauli-X basis, and
classical output. Using the random variable X to represent the distribution of output
samples, the probability distribution of outcomes x˜ ∈ {0, 1}np is:
P (X = x˜) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣〈x˜| exp
 na∑
i=1
iθ
⊗
j:Qij=1
Xj
 |0np〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(1)
Note that the i not used as an index is the imaginary unit.
Definition 2.2. Given some X-program, an IQP machine is any computational method
capable of efficiently returning a sample x˜ ∈ {0, 1}np from the probability distribution (1).
2.2 IQP In MBQC
We present an implementation of a given X-program in MBQC that will be used later in
our protocol design. First notice that using the equality below:
exp
 na∑
i=1
iθ
⊗
j:Qij=1
Xj
 = Hnp
 na∏
i=1
exp
iθ ⊗
j:Qij=1
Zj
Hnp
equation (1) can be rewritten as:
P (X = x˜) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣(〈x˜|Hnp)
 na∏
i=1
exp
iθ ⊗
j:Qij=1
Zj
 |+np〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(2)
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p˜1
...
p˜#i
p˜#i+1
...
p˜np
|+〉
. . .
Z
...
Z
Figure 1: The circuit implementing Expression (3). The input qubits {pj}npj=1 are rear-
ranged so that if #i is the Hamming weight of row i of matrix Q, then for k = 1, . . . ,#i
each p˜k corresponds to one pj such that Qij = 1 and for k = #i + 1, . . . , np they corre-
spond to the ones such that Qij = 0. The ancillary qubit measurement is in the basis
{|0θ〉 , |1θ〉} defined in expression (6).
For any given i, we now show the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. The circuit of Figure 1 implements the unitary:
exp
iθ ⊗
j:Qij=1
Zj
 (3)
Proof. To prove this statement, we will prove that the effect of Figure 1 and expression (3)
is the same on all inputs. Without loss of generality, we can consider only computational
basis input states |p〉 = |p1〉 . . .
∣∣pnp〉, pj ∈ {0, 1}. Since the operation that we perform is
linear, the result then follows for all inputs.
Notice that, representing the np-qubit identity operator by Inp , we can rewrite Ex-
pression (3) as:
cos θInp + i sin θ
⊗
j:Qij=1
Zj (4)
The above operator on |p〉 has two possible outcomes:
1. For the j ∈ {1, . . . , np} such that Qij = 1, if the number of |pj〉 = |1〉 is even,
then there will be a phase change of cos θ+ i sin θ, as the
⊗
j:Qij=1
Zj operator will
extract an even number of negatives.
2. For the j’s (j = 1, . . . , np) such that Qij = 1, if the number of |pj〉 = |1〉 is odd,
then the phase change will be cos θ − i sin θ.
Hence, depending on the parity of |p〉 in the positions where Qij = 1, the effect is to
produce one of the two states:
(cos θ ± i sin θ) |p〉 = e±iθ |p〉 (5)
We now show the effect of the circuit in Figure 1 is the same as the operator in
expression (4). For ease of readability, in Figure 1 we consider a permutation of the
states |p˜1〉 , . . . , |p˜#i〉 , . . . ,
∣∣p˜np〉 such that the first #i qubits are the ones for which the
value in the corresponding position in the program element is 1.
3
The action of the controlled-Z gates is to check the parity of |1〉’s in the input as
each appearance of a |1〉 will flip the bottom ancillary qubit between the states |+〉 and
|−〉. After the action of all controlled-Z operators, we have the state |p〉 |+〉 if there is an
even number of |p˜k〉 = |1〉 for k = 1, . . . ,#i and |p〉 |−〉 if this number is odd. Making a
measurement of the ancillary qubit in the basis:
{|0θ〉 , |1θ〉} =
{
1√
2
(
e−iθ |+〉+ eiθ |−〉
)
,
1√
2
(
e−iθ |+〉 − eiθ |−〉
)}
(6)
leaves us with one of the two states ±e−iθ |p〉 in the odd parity case and with the state
eiθ |p〉 in the even parity case. The negative sign preceding the exponential term in the
odd parity case comes from measuring the state |1θ〉 (a measurement outcome of 1) and
the positive sign comes from measuring |0θ〉.
In the case of a measurement outcome 1, we then apply Z operators to all unmeasured
qubits to ensure that the resulting states are as in expression (5) and with the same
dependency of the sign on the parity of |p〉.
We now consider generating the full distribution of equation (2) using measurement
based quantum computing [16, 17]. An MBQC computation consists of a graph describ-
ing the pattern of entanglement amongst the qubits in a state, a measurement pattern
describing the order of measurements of qubits in that state, and a set of corrections on
later measurements which can depend on the outcomes of previous ones. We now identify
all of these components of an MBQC computation in the case of an IQP computation.
Lemma 2.2. A graph and measurement pattern can always be designed to simulate an
X-program efficiently.
Proof. Producing the distribution in Eq. (2) can be achieved by inputting the state |+np〉
into a circuit made from composing circuits like the one in Figure 1 (one for each term
of the product in Eq. (2)) and measuring the result in the Hadamard basis. The Z
corrections commute with the controlled-Z operations and therefore they can be moved
to the end of the new, larger circuit.
Because there is no dependency between the measurements, they can be performed
in any order or even simultaneously. The Z corrections, conditional on the measurement
outcomes of the ancillary bits, can then be implemented via bit flips.
A formal description of the protocol described in these proofs can be found in Algo-
rithm 4 of the Appendix. We introduce some further terminology which is used in that
algorithm and in the remainder of this work.
The reader will notice that the entanglement pattern used in Algorithm 4 and implicit
in the proof of Lemma 2.2 is that of an undirected bipartite graph, which we will refer to
as an IQP graph.
Definition 2.3. An undirected bipartite graph, which we refer to as an IQP graph,
consists of a bipartition of vertices into two sets P and A of cardinality np and na respec-
tively. We may represent such a graph by Q ∈ {0, 1}na×np. An edge exists in the graph
when Qij = 1, for i = 1, . . . , na and j = 1, . . . , np. We call the set P primary vertices
and the set A ancillary vertices.
By referring to the bottom qubit of Figure 1 as the ancillary qubit and the others as
primary qubits we understand why this type of graph is relevant and how the X-program
matrix Q, interpreted and a bipartite graph, exactly describes the entanglement pattern.
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a1 a2
p1 p2 p3
Q =
(
1 0 1
0 1 0
)
Figure 2: An example of an IQP graph described by matrix Q. Here, np = 3 and na = 2
while the partition used is P = [p1, p2, p3] and A = [a1, a2].
Throughout this work, we refer to Q interchangeably as a matrix corresponding to an
X-program and a graph and the reader may wish to direct their attention to Figure 2 for
an example.
3 Blind Delegated IQP Computation
The next step towards our method for verifying IQP machines is to build a method for
blindly performing an IQP computation in a delegated setting. We consider a Client with
limited quantum power delegating an IQP computation to a powerful Server. The novel
method that we use in this work is to keep the X-program secret by not revealing the
quantum state used. The intuition behind the method used to perform this hiding is that
the Client will ask the Server to produce a quite general quantum state and then move
from that one to the one that is required for the computation. If this is done in a blind
way then the Server only has some knowledge of the general starting state from which any
number of other quantum states may have been built. Hence, there are two key problems
that to be addressed in the following subsections:
1. How to move from a general quantum state to a specific one representing an IQP
computation.
2. How to do so secretly in a delegated setting.
3.1 Break and Bridge
The break and bridge operations on a graph G˜ = (V˜ , E˜), with vertex set V˜ and edge
set E˜, which were introduced in [19, 21], are exactly those necessary to solve the ‘how to
move’ element of problem 1.
Definition 3.1. The break operator acts on a vertex v ∈ V˜ of degree 2 in a graph G˜. It
removes v from V˜ and also removes any edges connected to v from E˜.
The bridge operator acts also on a vertex v ∈ V˜ of degree 2 in a graph G˜. It removes
v from V˜ , removes any edges connected to v from E˜ and adds a new edge between the
neighbours of v.
Figure 3 gives an example of multiple applications of the bridge and break operators.
Once this is translated from a graph theoretic idea to an operation on quantum states,
we will have address the ‘how to move’ component of problem 1.
The extended IQP graphs, which we define now, is the ‘general quantum state’ also
mentioned in problem 1.
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Figure 3: An example of a sequence of one bridge and one break operation.
a1 a2
p1
b1
p2 p3
b2
Q˜ =
( −1 0 1
0 1 −1
)
Figure 4: An example of an extended IQP graph described by matrix Q˜ with (na, np, nb) =
(2, 3, 2), P = [p1, p2, p3] and A = [a1, a2]. Two vertices b1 and b2 are introduced and the
function g : Zna×np → Znb is defined as g (1, 1) = 1 and g (2, 3) = 2.
Definition 3.2. An extended IQP graph is represented by Q˜ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}na×np. The
vertex set contains A = {a1, ..., ana} and P =
{
p1, ..., pnp
}
while Q˜ij = 0 and Q˜ij = 1 has
the same implications, regarding the connections between these vertices, as in IQP graphs.
We interpret Q˜ij = −1 as the existence of an intermediary vertex bk between vertices
pj and ai, and denote with nb the number of -1s in Q˜. As such the vertex set also includes
the bridge and break vertices B = {b1, ..., bnb} and the edge set includes edges between
bk and ai as well as bk and pj when Q˜ij = −1. To keep track of these connections we
define the surjective function g for which g (i, j) = k where bk is the intermediate vertex
connected to ai and pj.
An extended IQP graph Q˜ can be built from an IQP graph Q by replacing any number
of the entries of Q with −1. Throughout the remainder of this work we will use the tilde
notation to represent an extended IQP graph Q˜ build from an IQP graph Q in this way.
Figure 4 displays an example of an extended IQP graph. By applying a bridge operator
to b1 and a break operation to b2 in Q˜ of Figure 4 we arrive at Q of Figure 2. It is in this
sense that an extended IQP graph is ‘more general’ that an IQP graph.
It is convenient to now introduce the following definition which allows us to use the
graphs defined above to describe the entanglement pattern of quantum states.
Definition 3.3. Consider a matrix G ∈ {−1, 0, 1}na×np and use function g (i, j) = k to
define index k = 1, . . . , nb for the elements Gij = −1. The circuit EG on (na + np + nb)
qubits applies controlled-Z operations between qubits pj and ai if Gij = 1 and, between
qubits bg(i,j) and ai, and, bg(i,j) and pj , when Gij = −1.
Using the above notation, the state built in Lemma 2.2 is EQ |+〉na+np . We refer to
such a state, or Z rotations there of, as an IQP state. We will call states of the form
EQ |+〉na+np or, again, their Z rotations, as IQP extended state
We can now state Lemma 3.1 which teaches us how to translate bridge and break
operations from graph theoretical ideas into practical operations on quantum states. A
similar lemma can be found in [19].
Lemma 3.1. Consider a quantum state EQ |φ〉 where |φ〉 is arbitrary. If Q˜ is an extended
IQP graph built from Q then there exists a state E
Q˜
|ψ〉, which can be transformed into
the state EQ |φ〉 through a sequence of Pauli-Y basis measurements on qubits and local
rotations around the Z axis on the unmeasured qubits through angles
{
0, pi2 , pi,
3pi
2
}
.
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x˜ =
{
x if honest
E (Q, ρB , θ) if dishonest
S
Q
x˜
E
ρB
Q˜,Q, θ
Figure 5: The ideal blind delegated IQP computation resource.
The detailed proof of Lemma 3.1, which can be found in Appendix A.1, shows us that
we can create the following state.
nb∏
k=1
(
S(−1)
sb
k
+rb
k
pj
⊗ S(−1)s
b
k
+rb
k
ai
)db
k (
Z
rb
k
pj ⊗ Zr
b
k
aj
)1−dk
EQ |φ〉 (7)
where pj and ai are the primary and ancillary qubits connected to bk respectively.
The operations performed to achieve this are measurements of the qubits correspond-
ing to bridge and break vertices (which we call bridge and break qubits) of E
Q˜
|ψ〉 in the
Pauli Y basis. The quantity sbk is the outcome of this measurement on qubit bk while the
quantities rbk and d
b
k tell us that said qubit was initialised in the state |bk〉 = Y r
b
k
√
Y
db
k |0〉.
It is possible to perform an IQP computation using this method. Although the quan-
tum state generated using this method would equal EQ
⊗na+np
1 |+〉 up to some S correc-
tions, these corrections may be accounted for by making corrections to the primary and
ancillary measurement bases (see also the circuits in Figures 14 and 15 in Appendix A.3).
Algorithm 5 of the Appendix uses the methods discussed to build an IQP state.
3.2 The Protocol
We can now address problem 2 of the introduction to this section. To do so we use the
tools of the previous section to blindly create an IQP state at the Server side. What we
wish is to construct the Ideal Resource of Figure 5 which takes as input from the Client an
IQP computation, (Q, θ), and in return gives a classical output x˜. If the Server is honest,
then x˜ comes from the distribution corresponding to (Q, θ). If the Server is dishonest,
then they can input some quantum operation E and some quantum state ρB and force
the output to the Client into the classical state E (Q, θ, ρB). We would like for the Server
only to receive a IQP extended graph Q˜ which can be built from Q, the distribution Q
over the possible Q from which Q˜ could be built and θ. Let us assume that this is public
knowledge.
The proposed real communication protocol is described in detail by Algorithm 1 and
graphically shown in Figure 6. The element of blindness is added to the work of Section
3.1 and Algorithm 5 by introducing some random rotations on the primary and ancillary
qubits. These rotations are such that they can be corrected by rotating, in the same
way, the measurement bases of those qubits, and therefore ensuring that the original IQP
computation is being performed.
During the execution of the protocol of Algorithm 1, the Server sends two classical bit
strings to the Client that correspond to the measurement outcomes of the sent qubits. If
the Server wants to deviate from the protocol, he will again use some quantum map E on
the information received so far together with the state ρB he has in his own register. At
the final step of the protocol the Server may output some quantum state ρ′B.
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Algorithm 1 Blind distributed IQP computation
Public: Q˜,Q, θ
Client input: Q
Client output: x˜
Protocol:
1: The Client randomly generates rp, dp ∈ {0, 1}np and ra, da ∈ {0, 1}na where np and
na are the numbers of primary and ancillary qubits respectively.
2: The Client generates the states |pj〉 = Zr
p
jSd
p
j |+〉 and |ai〉 = Zrai Sdai |+〉 for j ∈
{1, . . . , np} and i ∈ {1, . . . , na}
3: Client creates db ∈ {0, 1}nb in the following way: For i = 1, . . . , na and j = 1, . . . , np,
if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 0, then dbk = 0 else if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 1 then dbk = 1.
He keeps track of the relation between k and (i, j) via the surjective function g :
Zna×np → Znb .
4: The Client generates rb ∈ {0, 1}nb at random and produces the states |bk〉 =
Y r
b
k
(√
Y
)db
k |0〉 for k ∈ {1, . . . , nb}
5: State ρ comprising of all of the Client’s produced states is sent to the Server.
6: The Server implements E
Q˜
.
7: The Server measures qubits b1, . . . , bnb in the Y -basis
{∣∣+Y 〉 , ∣∣−Y 〉} and sends the
outcome sb ∈ {0, 1}nb to the Client.
8: The Client calculates Πz,Πs ∈ {0, 1}np and Az, As ∈ {0, 1}na using equations (8), (9),
(10) and (11).
Πzj =
∑
i,k:g(i,j)=k
rbk
(
1− dbk
)
− rpj (8)
Πsj =
∑
i,k:g(i,j)=k
(−1)sbk+rbkdbk − dpj (9)
Azi =
∑
j,k:g(i,j)=k
rbk
(
1− dbk
)
− rai (10)
Asi =
∑
j,k:g(i,j)=k
(−1)sbk+rbkdbk − dai (11)
9: The Client sends A ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}na and Π ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}np for the ancillary and primary
qubits respectively, where Ai = A
s
i + 2A
z
i (mod 4) and Πj = Π
s
j + 2Π
z
j (mod 4).
10: The Server measures the respective qubits in the basis below for the ancillary and
primary qubits respectively.
S−Ai {|0θ〉 , |1θ〉} and S−Πj {|+〉 , |−〉} (12)
The measurement outcomes sp ∈ {0, 1}np and sa ∈ {0, 1}na are sent to the Client.
11: The Client generates and outputs x˜ ∈ {0, 1}np as follows.
x˜j = s
p
j +
∑
i:Qij=1
sai (mod 2) (13)
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piA
Q
x˜
ρ
sb
A,Π
sa, sp
piB
E
ρB
ρ′B
Q˜,Q, θ
R
Figure 6: The real communication protocol of Algorithm 1.
To prove composable security of the proposed protocol we drop the notion of a mali-
cious Server for that of a global distinguisher that has a view of all inputs and outputs of
the relevant resources. To recreate the view of a malicious Server, we develop a simulator
σ interfacing between the ideal resource S of Figure 5 and the distinguisher in such a way
that the latter cannot tell the difference between an interaction with the ideal resource
and the real protocol. We employ the Abstract Cryptography framework introduced in
[22, 23] and teleportation techniques inspired by [24] to prove security in the case of a
malicious Server. We will prove that:
piAR ≡ Sσ (14)
where R is the communication channel (quantum and classical) used by the Client and
the Server in the protocol.
Theorem 3.1. The protocol described by Algorithm 1 is information theoretically secure
against a dishonest Server.
For the sake of brevity, we give only an intuitive proof here and leave a thorough proof
to Appendix A.1.
Proof. The proof consists of a pattern of transformations of the real protocol of Algorithm
1, into the ideal resource plus simulator setting of Algorithm 2. These transformations
leave the computation unchanged, therefore ensuring the indistinguishability of the two
settings and so the security of the protocol. As the computation itself is not changed
by the transformations we also ensure that we are still sampling from the original IQP
distribution, providing evidence for the correctness of Algorithm 2.
Line 2 of Algorithm 1 generates at random one of the four states |+〉, ∣∣+Y 〉, |−〉 and∣∣−Y 〉. The same effect is achieved by measuring an EPR pair with equal probability in
one of the bases {|+〉 , |−〉} and {∣∣+Y 〉 , ∣∣−Y 〉}. The application of the (√Y )dbk operation
in line 4 of Algorithm 1 decides, according to the graph to be created, if the bridge
and break qubit will be drawn from the set {|+〉 , |−〉} or {|0〉 , |1〉}. Using the same
information to choose between the measurement bases {|+〉 , |−〉} and {|0〉 , |1〉} on one
half of an EPR pair has the same effect. The random rotation Y r
b
k then has the same
effect of the randomness that is intrinsic to the EPR pair measurement. This may be
visualised in Figure 7 which presents a simple rearrangement of the Real Resource of
Figure 6 in order to isolate the state generation phase pi1A and to examine an equivalent
circuit based on teleportation.
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Algorithm 2 Blind distributed IQP computation with simulator
Public: Q˜,Q, θ
Client input: Q
Client output: x˜
The simulator
1: Generates np + na + nb EPR pairs and sends half of each to the ideal resource and
the other half to the distinguisher.
2: Receives the bitstring sb ∈ {0, 1}nb from the distinguisher and forwards it to the ideal
resource.
3: Randomly generates Π ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}np and A ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3]na and sends them to the
ideal resource and distinguisher.
4: Receives the bitstrings sp ∈ {0, 1}np and sa ∈ {0, 1}na from the distinguisher and
forwards them to the ideal resource.
The ideal resource
1: Calculates db ∈ {0, 1}nb in the following way: For i = 1, . . . , na and j = 1, . . . , np, if
Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 0, then dbk = 0 else if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 1 then dbk = 1. Keep
track of the relation between k and (i, j) via the surjective function g : Zna×np → Znb .
2: Measures the corresponding half EPR pairs in the bases
√
Y
db
k {|0〉 , |1〉} getting out-
comes rbk, for k = 1, . . . , nb.
3: Calculates dp ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}np and da ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}na using equations (15) and (16)
respectively.
d
p
j =
∑
i,k:g(i,j)=k
(−1)sbk+rbkdbk + 2
∑
i,k:g(i,j)=k
rbk
(
1− dbk
)
−Πj (15)
dai =
∑
j,k:g(i,j)=k
(−1)sbk+rbkdbk + 2
∑
j,k:g(i,j)=k
rbk
(
1− dbk
)
−Ai (16)
4: Measures the remaining half of the EPR pairs corresponding to the ancillary and
primary qubits in the bases Sd
a
i {|+〉 , |−〉} and Sdpj {|+〉 , |−〉}, getting outcomes rai
and rpj for i = 1, . . . , na and j = 1, . . . , np respectively.
5: Generates and outputs x˜ ∈ {0, 1}np using equation (17).
x˜j =
(
s
p
j + r
p
j
)
+
∑
i:Qij=1
(sai + r
a
i ) (17)
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Q
pi1A
ρ
E
ρS
ρ′S
piB
sb
A,Π
sa, sp
pi2A
x˜
Q˜,Q, θ
pi1A
Q f
|+〉
|0〉
...
... ...|+〉
|0〉
. . . ρ
... r
dp,a
Figure 7: The real protocol with the state generation phase of the protocol, pi1A isolated
(left) and further analysed (right) using an equivalent protocol based on teleportation,
where f represents the measurement angle calculation on one half of the EPR pairs (see
Algorithm 6 in Appendix for details).
The next transformation is to delay the first measurement of the EPR pairs as implied
in Figure 8. Since information about the measurement outcome r is not yet available to
define Π and A, the Client chooses random Π and A which will then corrected for by
using these values to compute the measurement bases for the Client’s half of the primary
and ancillary EPR pairs.
Finally, Figure 9 simply involves a rearrangement of the players in Figure 8 to match
those in the simulator/distinguisher setting. The formal description of the protocol dis-
played by Figure 9 is seen in Algorithm 2.
We can now be sure that our communication protocol is indistinguishable from an
ideal resource (defined in Figure 5) which performs an IQP computation without commu-
nicating any information to the Server which is not already public. This means that the
communication protocol does not reveal any information about the computation to the
Server. Furthermore, this is proven in a composable framework [22, 23, 24] and so can be
used as part of future protocols as we will in section 4.
4 The Hypothesis Test
4.1 Previous work
We now have all the tools to form a test for a Server to run in order to prove to a Client
that they are capable of solving classically non-simulatable problems. Specifically, we ask
the Server to perform an IQP computation that we believe is classically hard, but whose
solution can easily be checked by a classical Client.
The general idea of our Hypothesis Test, building on the work of [10], is that there
is some hidden structure in the program elements, qi, of the X-program that results in
some structure in the distribution of the outputs, known only to the Client. The Client
can use this structure to check the Server’s reply. A Server possessing an IQP machine
can reproduce this structure by implementing the X-program. A Server not in possession
of an IQP machine cannot generate outputs obeying the same rules.
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Q
f̂
|+〉 ρ
|0〉
Π, A
r
E
ρB
ρ′B
piB
sb
sa, sp
pi2A
x˜
Q˜,Q, θ
Figure 8: The real protocol with only one input qubit for simplicity, where the Client
sends random measurement instructions A,Π to the Server and delays the teleportation
measurement until after the Server has sent the measurement outcomes s =
{
sa, sb, sp
}
.
r =
{
rp, ra, rb
}
. Here f̂ represents the process of calculating measurement angles to be
performed on one half of the EPR pair from Eqs. (15) and (16) (for details see Algorithm
7 in the Appendix).
Q
f̂
|+〉
|0〉 ρ
σ
E
ρB
ρ′B
piB
sb
Π, A
sa, sp
pi2A
x˜
S
r
Q˜,Q, θ
Figure 9: The ideal resource S and the simulator σ for the malicious Server, shown with
only one input qubit for simplicity. The simulator has no access to the private information
Q and any time. A global distinguisher cannot tell the difference between this setting
and the real protocol.
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We summarise this discussion by three conditions that a hypothesis test using this
method must meet.
1.1 The Client asks the Server to perform an IQP computation that is hard to classically
simulate.
1.2 The Client can check the solution to this computation because they know some
secret structure that makes this checking processes efficient.
1.3 The Server must be unable to uncover this structure in polynomial time.
A particular ‘known structure’ of the output which is used in [10] to satisfy condition 1.2
is its bias.
Definition 4.1. If X is a random variable taking values in {0, 1}np and s ∈ {0, 1}np then
the bias of X in the direction s is P
(
X · sT = 0) where the product is performed modulo
2. Hence, the bias of a distribution in the direction s is the probability of a sample from
the distribution being orthogonal to s.
To calculate the bias of X in direction s ∈ {0, 1}n, we form the linear code Cs by
selecting all rows, qi of the X-program, (Q, θ) ∈ {0, 1}na×np× [0, 2pi], such that qi ·sT = 1
and forming, from them, a new matrix, Qs, which is the generator matrix of Cs. Defining
ns to be the number of rows of Qs allows us to understand the following expression. The
derivation can be found in [10].
P
(
X · sT = 0) = Ec∼Cs [cos2 (θ (ns − 2 ·#c))] (18)
We find that the bias of an X-program in the direction s depends only on θ and the
linear code defined by the generator matrix Qs. One can now imagine a hypothesis test
derived from these facts. Although the X-program that will be implemented, needs to be
made public, the direction s which will be used for checking, will be kept secret. This
gives a Client, with the computational power to calculate the quantity of expression (18),
the necessary information to compute the bias, but does not afford the Server the same
privilege.
What we want to show is that the only way for the Server to produce an output with
the correct bias is to use an IQP machine. If the Server could somehow uncover s then
they could calculate the value of expression (18) and return vectors to the Client which
are orthogonal to s with the correct probability. We specialise the conditions mentioned
at the beginning of this section to this particular method.
2.1 The X-Program sent to a Server represents an IQP computation that is hard to
classically simulate.
2.2 It must be possible for a Client, having knowledge of a secret s and the X-program,
to calculate the quantity of expression (18).
2.3 The knowledge of the Server must be insufficient to learn the value of s.
In [10] the authors develop a protocol for building an X-program and a vector s
performing this type of hypothesis test. The code Cs used to build the X-program is a
quadratic residue code with θ = pi8 . Condition 2.1 is conjectured, by [10], to be satisfied
by these X-programs. This conjecture is supported by giving a classical simulation that is
believed to be optimal and achieves maximum bias value 0.75; different from that expected
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from an IQP machine. A hypothesis test with X-programs, such as the random circuits
of [13], for which connections to an implausible collapse in the polynomial hierarchy has
been made, is an open problem. Condition 2.2 is also satisfied by the construction in [10],
by proving that the bias value, which is cos2
(
pi
8
)
for their choice of X-program and s, can
be calculated in polynomial time.
The way in which condition 2.3 is addressed in [10] relies on the fact that the right-
hand side expression of Eq.(18) is equal for all generator matrices in a matroid [25].
Definition 4.2. A i-point binary matroid is an equivalence class of matrices with i
rows, defined over F2. Two matrices, M1 and M2, are said to be equivalent if, for some
permutation matrix R, the column echelon reduced form of M1 is the same as the column
echelon reduced form of R·M2 (In the case where the column dimensions do not match, we
define equivalence by deleting columns containing only 0s after column echelon reduction).
In order to move to a new matrix within the same matroid, consider the right-
multiplication with matrix A on Q. Notice that qis
T = (qiA)
(
A−1sT
)
. Rows which
were originally non-orthogonal to s are now non-orthogonal to A−1sT , hence we can
locate Qs in Q by using A
−1sT .
A way to hide s is therefore to randomise it with such an operation A. We now
understand what to do to the X-program we are considering, so that the value of the bias
does not change. To increase the hiding of s, the matrix might also include additional
rows orthogonal to s, which do not affect the value of the bias. The combination of matrix
randomisation and the addition of new rows makes it hard, as conjectured in [10], up to
some computational complexity assumptions, for the Server to recover s from the matrix
that it receives. It is now simply a matter for the Server to implement the X-program
and for the Client to check the bias of the output in the direction s. This is the approach
used by [10] to address condition 2.3.
4.2 Our Protocol
The main contribution of this work is to revisit condition 2.3. By giving to the Client
limited quantum capabilities, we remove the computational assumption of [10], and there-
fore provide unconditional security against a powerful quantum Server. In Algorithm 3
we provide a hypothesis test that uses the blind delegated IQP computation resource of
the previous section to verify quantum supremacy.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 3 presents an information-theoretically secure solution to con-
dition 2.3.
Proof. Let us begin by recalling that when Cs in expression (18) is the quadratic residue
code space then we know that the value of that expression is cos2 pi8 .
Notice that, in particular, the all one vector is in the quadratic residue code space.
As such the matrix Qs, introduced on line 2 of Algorithm 3, which is the quadratic code
generator matrix Qr with a column of all ones appended to it also generates the quadratic
residue code.
The vector s ∈ {0, 1}np with all zero entries, with the exception of the last entry which
is set to one, is non orthogonal to all rows of Qs. Hence, adhering to the notation here
and of Section 4.1, Cs is the quadratic residue code and expression (18) is equal to cos2 pi8 .
The reader may refer to Figures 10 and 11 for some intuition about the above matrices.
A, defined in line 5 of Algorithm 3, is the operation which adds columns of Qs, chosen
when ŝi = 1, to the last column of Qs. We know that the resulting matrix, Q = QsA, is
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a1
. . .
ana
p1 p2 . . .
pnp−1
Qr
Figure 10: Quadtatic residue code generator matrix, Qr, and the graph that it describes.
Note that, to save space, this is only illustrative and that the connections in this image do
not correspond to an actual quadratic residue code. This is implied by the dotted lines.
a1
. . .
ana
p1 p2 . . .
pnp−1 pnp
Qs =
 1Qr ...
1

Figure 11: A matrix also generating the quadratic residue code space.
also a generator matrix of the quadratic residue code as all the columns of Qs are in the
quadratic residue code space. We also know, from the discussion of Section 4.1, that all
the rows of Q are non-orthogonal to A−1sT . As such CA−1sT , when Q is the X-program
of concern, is the quadratic residue code space and hence the bias of the X-program Q in
the direction A−1sT is cos2 pi8 . This matrix may be visualised in Figure 12 and this fact
is exploited in line 11 of Algorithm 3.
We know, however, that from any Q we can make the IQP extended graph Q˜, which
is the matrix Qr with a column of minus ones appended to the end. Observing Figure 13
may help to visualise this. We can now use the resource of Section 3.2 to perform a blind
IQP computation.
By using the blind IQP computation resource of Section 3.2 we have solved condition
2.3 but do so now with information theoretic security as opposed to the reliance on
computational complexity assumptions used by [10]. This is true because, as a product
of using the resource of Section 3.2, the Server learns only the distribution Q over the
possible set of graphs Q. By setting Q = QsA, Algorithm 3 develops a bijection mapping
ŝ ∈ {0, 1}np−1 to a unique matrix Q ∈ {0, 1}na×np . So Q is equivalent to the distribution
from which ŝ is drawn. In this case it is the uniform distribution over a set of size
2np−1.
a1
. . .
ana
p1 p2 . . .
pnp−1 pnp
Q =
 1Qr ... ⊕np−1j=1 ŝjQrj
1

Figure 12: A randomised version of Figure 11. Here Qrj is the j
th column of Qr
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a1
. . .
ana
p1 p2 . . .
pnp−1 pnp
b1
bnb
Q˜ =
 −1Qr ...
−1

Figure 13: An IQP extended graph of all possible Q of Figure 12
Algorithm 3 Our hypothesis test protocol
Input: na prime such that na + 1 is a multiple of 8.
Client output: o ∈ {0, 1}
Protocol:
1: Set np =
na+1
2
2: Take the quadratic residue code generator matrix Qr ∈ {0, 1}na×(np−1)
3: Let Qs ∈ {0, 1}na×np be Qr with a column of ones appended to the last column.
4: Pick ŝ ∈ {0, 1}np−1 chosen uniformly at random.
5: Define the matrix A ∈ {0, 1}np×np according to equation (19).
Ai,j =

1 if i = j
0 if i 6= j and j < np
ŝi if j = np and i < np
(19)
6: Set Q = QsA and θ =
pi
8 .
7: Set Q˜ to be the matrix Qr with a column of −1 appended.
8: Set Q to be the uniform distribution over all possible Q for different ŝ.
9: Perform the IQP computation Q using Algorithm 1 with inputs Q, Q˜, Q and θ and
outputs x˜ and ρ′B .
10: Let s ∈ {0, 1}np be the vector with entries all equal to zero with the exception of the
last which is set to one.
11: Test the orthogonality of the output x˜ against A−1sT setting o = 0 if it is not orthog-
onal and o = 1 if it is orthogonal.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a protocol that can be used by a limited quantum Client, able to
prepare one-qubit Pauli operator eigenstates, to delegate the construction of IQP circuits
to a powerful quantum Server. By giving the Client of the computation limited quantum
abilities (i.e. manipulation of single qubits), we have managed to remove the computa-
tional restriction of the Server required in previous work [10], and therefore have proven
information-theoretical security against a malicious Server. The protocol is also proven
to be composable and therefore can be used to verify an IQP machine as part of a larger
delegated computation.
IQP circuits are also important because they are relatively easy to implement in an
experimental setup in comparison to fully fledged quantum computers needed for universal
computations. Our protocol requires two layers of measurements, in order to do the
appropriate corrections resulting from the blind creation of the state at the Server’s side,
and for a small number of qubits, it can be implemented even with present technology.
A future avenue of research would therefore be the study of this protocol under realistic
experimental errors in view of a potential implementation.
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A Appendix
A.1 Detailed proof of Lemma 3.1
Lemma A.1. Consider a quantum state EQ |φ〉 where |φ〉 is arbitrary. If Q˜ is an extended
IQP graph built from Q then there exists a state E
Q˜
|ψ〉, which can be transformed into
the state EQ |φ〉 through a sequence of Pauli-Y basis measurements on qubits and local
rotations around the Z axis on the unmeasured qubits through angles
{
0, pi2 , pi,
3pi
2
}
.
Proof. This proof is by construction. We will define a scheme for building the state |ψ〉
and a corresponding IQP extended graph Q˜ meeting the conditions of the lemma.
We begin by considering the case where Q˜ was built from the graph Q by replacing
one of the entries, say (i, j), of Q with −1. Q can be built from Q˜ either by applying
a break operation to the vertex b1=g(i,j), or by applying a bridge operation to this same
vertex.
We now move to consider these two separate cases.
• Break: Qij = 0. Define the state EQ˜ |ψ〉 as below.
E
Q˜
|ψ〉 = cZai,b1cZpj ,b1EQ |φ〉 |b1〉 (20)
Here we set |b1〉 =
∣∣rb1〉 with rb1 ∈ {0, 1}, and cZpj ,b1 and cZai,b1 are the controlled op-
erators on the respective qubits. Notice then that cZai,b1cZpj ,b1EQ indeed describes
the same entanglement pattern as E
Q˜
.
Applying the controlled-Z operations is equivalent to applying the operator Zr
b
1 to
each of the qubits ai and pj. We can conclude:
E
Q˜
|ψ〉 = Zrb1ai Zr
b
1
pjEQ |φ〉 |b1〉 (21)
Measuring the qubit b1 in the Pauli-Y basis causes a collapse to either of the Pauli-Y
basis states with equal likelihood. It does not, however, have any other effect on the
state as the qubit b1 is disentangled. We can therefore discard it and be left with
the state Z
rb
1
ai Z
rb
1
pjEQ |φ〉 which differs from EQ |φ〉 only by local rotations about the
Z axis.
• Bridge: Qij = 1. Define the state EQ˜ |ψ〉 as below.
E
Q˜
|ψ〉 = cZai,b1cZpj ,b1cZai,pjEQ |φ〉 |b1〉 (22)
Here |b1〉 = 1√2
(
|0〉+ (−1)rb1 |1〉
)
with rb1 ∈ {0, 1} (i.e a Hadamard basis state).
Notice that cZai,b1cZpj ,b1cZai,pjEQ describes the same operation as EQ˜.
Applying the operations, cZai,b1 and cZpj ,b1 to the state cZai,pjEQ |φ〉 |b1〉 is equiv-
alent to applying the following operator to the state cZai,pjEQ |φ〉.
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1√
2
|0〉 ⊗ Iai ⊗ Ipj + (−1)r
b
1
1√
2
|1〉 ⊗ Zai ⊗ Zpj (23)
The above process followed by a measurement of qubit b1 in the Pauli-Y basis is
equivalent to applying the following operator to cZai,pjEQ |φ〉.
1√
2
Iai ⊗ Ipj + (−1)1−s
b
1 (−1)rb1 i 1√
2
Zai ⊗ Zpj (24)
Here we have used the notation that sb1 = 0 when
∣∣+Y 〉 is measured and sb1 = 1 when∣∣−Y 〉 is measured. The expression results from post multiplication of expression (23)
by 1√
2
〈0| + (−1)1−sb1 i 1√
2
〈1|, the conjugate of the Pauli-Y basis states, followed by
the appropriate normalisation. The original state of equation (22) is transformed,
by this measurement, to the state:(
1√
2
Iai ⊗ Ipj + (−1)1−s
b
1 (−1)rb1 i 1√
2
Zai ⊗ Zpj
)
cZai,pjEQ |φ〉 (25)
Notice that the controlled-Z operator can be written as:
cZ1,2 =
1
2
(I1 ⊗ I2 + Z1 ⊗ I2 + I1 ⊗ Z2 + Z1 ⊗ Z2) . (26)
Using this fact allows us to see:
cZ1,2 = (S1 ⊗ S2)
(
1√
2
I1 ⊗ I2 + i 1√
2
Z1 ⊗ Z2
)
(27)
cZ1,2 =
(
S−11 ⊗ S−12
)( 1√
2
I1 ⊗ I2 − i 1√
2
Z1 ⊗ Z2
)
(28)
In particular:
cZai,pj =
S(−1)1−sb1
(
−(−1)rb1
)
ai ⊗ S
(−1)1−sb1
(
−(−1)rb1
)
pj

(
1√
2
Iai ⊗ Ipj − (−1)1−s
b
1 (−1)rb1 i 1√
2
Zai ⊗ Zpj
)
(29)
Substituting this into (25), and with some rearranging, we realise the resulting state
is actually that of equation (30).(
S(−1)
sb
1
+rb
1
a1
⊗ S(−1)s
b
1
+rb
1
pj
)
EQ |φ〉 (30)
Once again this differs from the state EQ |φ〉 only by local rotations around the Z
axis.
We now turn to the case where the number of break and bridge operations needed
to move from Q˜ to Q is more than one. The state E
Q˜
|ψ〉 can be built one step at
a time by repeating the steps above (i.e. entangling the appropriate bridge and break
qubits one at a time). The proof that the state resulting from measurements of the
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qubits b1, ..., bm would result in the graph EQ |φ〉 follows for the following reasoning.
Since the qubits that might require corrections are never measured, all measurements and
corrections commute. The entanglement operators too commute with the corrections and
the measurement operations when they do not act upon the same qubits. As such all
operations commute, therefore all the necessary entanglement operations, measurement
operations and all the necessary corrections can be done in this order, all at once.
Algorithm 4 IQP computation
Input: Q ∈ {0, 1}na×np , θ
Output: x ∈ {0, 1}np
Protocol:
1: Generate states |+〉 = |pj〉 and |+〉 = |ai〉 for j ∈ {0, ...np} and i ∈ {0, ...na}.
2: Implement the operations EQ on the generated qubits.
3: Measure primary qubits in the Hadamard basis and ancillary qubits in the basis of
equation (6) to obtain measurement outcomes sp ∈ {0, 1}np and sa ∈ {0, 1}na .
4: Perform corrections according to equation (31) to generate output x˜.
x˜j = s
p
j +
∑
i:Qij=1
sai (mod 2) (31)
A.2 Extended Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem A.1. The protocol described by Algorithm 1 is secure against a dishonest
Server.
Proof. The proof consists of a pattern of transformations of the real protocol of Algo-
rithm 1, into the ideal resource of Algorithm 2, which leaves the computation unchanged,
therefore ensuring the indistinguishability of the two settings.
The first transformation we perform is of the state generation phase of the Algorithm
1. The new method we use for this phase is described in Algorithm 6 and relies on the
measurement of EPR pairs to produce qubits in the correct basis, with some randomness
resulting from the measurement. This may be visualised by the expansion of pi1A seen in
Figure 8 in the main text.
While lines 1, 2 and 4 of Algorithm 1 and the lines 1, 2, 3 and 5 of Algorithm 6
differ the remainder of both algorithms is identical. We show now that the algorithms
are indistinguishable.
Firstly consider the generation of rp and ra. In Algorithm 1 these terms are picked
uniformly at random from the set of all binary stings of the appropriate length. In the
case of Algorithm 6 they are generated by measurements on EPR pairs, the result of
which is entirely random. Similarly, in both cases, rb is picked uniformly at random from
the set of all binary strings of the appropriate length.
Line 2 of Algorithm 1 generates at random one of the four states |+〉, ∣∣+Y 〉, |−〉 and∣∣−Y 〉. Line 3 of Algorithm 6 achieves the same effect by measuring an EPR pair with
equal probability in one of the basis {|+〉 , |−〉} and {∣∣+Y 〉 , ∣∣−Y 〉}.
Finally, the application of the
(√
Y
)dbj
operation in line 4 of Algorithm 1 decides,
according the graph to be created, if the bridge and break qubit will be drawn from the
set {|+〉 , |−〉} or {|0〉 , |1〉}. Choosing between using the measurement basis {|+〉 , |−〉} or
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Algorithm 5 Distributed IQP computation
Public: Q˜,Q, θ
Client input: Q ∈ {0, 1}na×np
Client output: x˜
Protocol:
1: The Client generates the states |+〉 = |pj〉 and |+〉 = |ai〉 for j ∈ {0, ...np} and
i ∈ {0, ...na}
2: Client creates db ∈ {0, 1}nb in the following way: For i = 1, . . . , na and j = 1, . . . , np,
if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 0, then dbk = 0 else if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 1 then dbk = 1.
He keeps track of the relation between k and (i, j) via the surjective function g :
Zna×np → Znb .
3: The Client generates rb ∈ {0, 1}nb at random and produces the states |bk〉 =
Y r
b
k
(√
Y
)db
k |0〉 for k ∈ {1, ..., nb}
4: State ρ comprising of all of the Client’s produced states is sent to the Server.
5: The Server implements E
Q˜
.
6: The Server measures qubits b1, ..., bnb in the Y -basis
{∣∣+Y 〉 , ∣∣−Y 〉} and sends the
outcome sb ∈ {0, 1}nb to the Client.
7: The Client calculates Πz,Πs ∈ {0, 1}np and Az, As ∈ {0, 1}na using equations (32) -
(35).
Πzj =
∑
i,k:g(i,j)=k
rbk
(
1− dbk
)
(32)
Πsj =
∑
i,k:g(i,j)=k
(−1)sbk+rbkdbk (33)
Azi =
∑
j,k:g(i,j)=k
rbk
(
1− dbk
)
(34)
Asi =
∑
j,k:g(i,j)=k
(−1)sbk+rbkdbk (35)
8: The Client sends A ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}na and Π ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}np for the ancillary and primary
qubits respectively, where Ai = A
s
i + 2A
z
i (mod 4) and Πj = Π
s
j + 2Π
z
j (mod 4).
9: The Server measures their qubits in the basis below, for the ancillary and primary
qubits respectively.
S−Ai {|0θ〉 , |1θ〉} and S−Πj {|+〉 , |−〉} (36)
The measurement outcomes sp ∈ {0, 1}np and sa ∈ {0, 1}na are sent to the Client.
10: The Client generates and outputs x˜ ∈ {0, 1}np using equation (13)
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{|0〉 , |1〉} on one half of an EPR pair of course has the same effect. The random rotation
Y r
b
j then has the same effect of the randomness that is intrinsic to the measurement
performed in Algorithm 6.
Consider now the transformation from Algorithm 6 to Algorithm 7. Notice that line 3
of Algorithm 6 is identical to that of line 9 of Algorithm 7. This operation can be delayed
without affecting the computation as the qubit being measured is not acted upon in any
other way during the protocol.
Consider Π and A. In Algorithm 7 they are generated at random from the set of all
Π ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3]np and A ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3]na as stated in line 7. This is the case too for Algorithm
6 because Πzi , Π
s
i , A
z
k and A
s
k are one time padded by r
p
i , d
p
i , r
a
k and d
a
k respectively as
seen in equations (8), (9), (10) and (11).
It remains to show that Algorithm 7 results in the same computation as Algorithm
6. This can be achieved by noting a simple rearrangement of equations (8), (9), (10)
and (11) to make dpi and d
a
k the subject. In doing so we assume the r
i
p, r
k
a = 0 which is
corrected for, if this is not the case, in equation (17). The reader may wish to refer to
Figure 8 in the main text for a visualisation of this new resource.
Finally, Algorithm 2 simply involves a relabeling of the players in the protocol of
Algorithm 7 to match those in the simulator distinguisher setting. This amounts to the
transformation from Figure 8 to Figure 9 in the main text.
This series of transformations convinces us that the following relationship is true and
that the resource of Algorithm 1 is composably secure against a dishonest Server.
piAR ≡ Sσ (37)
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Algorithm 6 Blind distributed IQP computation with teleportation technique
Public: Q˜,Q, θ
Client input: Q
Client output: x˜
Protocol:
1: The Client randomly generates dp ∈ {0, 1}np and da ∈ [0, 1]na where np and na are
the numbers of primary and ancillary qubits respectively.
2: The Client generates np EPR pairs
∣∣∣EPRpj〉, na EPR pairs |EPRai 〉 and a further nb
EPR pairs
∣∣EPRbk〉.
3: The Client measures one half of each of
∣∣∣EPRpj〉 in the basis Sdpj {|+〉 , |−〉} to achieve
outcome rpj and one half of each of |EPRai 〉 in the basis Sd
a
i {|+〉 , |−〉} to achieve
outcome rai .
4: Client creates db ∈ {0, 1}nb in the following way: For i = 1, . . . , na and j = 1, . . . , np,
if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 0, then dbk = 0 else if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 1 then dbk = 1.
He keeps track of the relation between k and (i, j) via the surjective function g :
Zna×np → Znb .
5: The Client measures one half of each of
∣∣EPRbk〉 in the basis √Y dbk {|0〉 , |1〉} to achieve
outcome rbk.
6: State ρ comprising of all unmeasured states in the Client’s position is sent to the
server.
7: The Server implements E
Q˜
.
8: The Server measures qubits b1, ..., bnb in the Y -basis
{∣∣+Y 〉 , ∣∣−Y 〉} and sends the
outcome sb ∈ {0, 1}nb to the Client.
9: The Client calculates Πz,Πs ∈ {0, 1}np and Az, As ∈ {0, 1}na using equations (8), (9),
(10) and (11).
10: The Client sends A ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}na and Π ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}np for the ancillary and primary
qubits respectively, where Ai = A
s
i + 2A
z
i (mod 4) and Πj = Π
s
j + 2Π
z
j (mod 4).
11: The Server measures their qubits in the two basis of equation (12) for the ancillary
and primary qubits respectively. The measurement outcomes sp ∈ {0, 1}np and sa ∈
{0, 1}na are sent to the Client.
12: The Client generates and outputs x˜ ∈ {0, 1}np using equation (13)
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Algorithm 7 Blind distributed IQP computation with teleportation technique, rear-
rangement and pre-made randomness
Public: Q˜,Q , θ
Client input: Q
Client output: x˜
Protocol:
1: The Client generates np EPR pairs
∣∣∣EPRpj〉, na EPR pairs |EPRai 〉 and a further nb
EPR pairs
∣∣EPRbk〉.
2: Half of each EPR pair is sent, by the Client, to the Server.
3: Client creates db ∈ {0, 1}nb in the following way: For i = 1, . . . , na and j = 1, . . . , np,
if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 0, then dbk = 0 else if Q˜ij = −1 and Qij = 1 then dbk = 1.
He keeps track of the relation between k and (i, j) via the surjective function g :
Zna×np → Znb .
4: The Client measures one half of each of
∣∣EPRbk〉 in the basis √Y dbk {|0〉 , |1〉} to achieve
outcome rbk.
5: The Server implements E
Q˜
.
6: Qubits b1, ..., bnb are measured by the Server in the y-basis
{∣∣+Y 〉 , ∣∣−Y 〉}, producing
the outcome sb ∈ {0, 1}nb which are returned to the Client.
7: The Client randomly generated Π ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}np and A ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3]na where np and
na are the numbers of primary and ancillary qubits respectively.
8: The Client calculates dpj ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}np and dai ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}na using equations (15)
and (16) respectively.
9: The Client measures one half of each of
∣∣∣EPRpj〉 in the basis Sdpj {|+〉 , |−〉} to achieve
outcome rpj and one half of each of |EPRai 〉 in the basis Sd
a
i {|+〉 , |−〉} to achieve
outcome rai .
10: The Client sends A ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}na and Π ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}np for the ancillary and primary
qubits respectively.
11: The Server measures their qubits in the two basis of equation (12) for the ancillary
and primary qubits respectively. The measurement outcomes sp ∈ {0, 1}np and sa ∈
{0, 1}na are sent to the Client.
12: The Client generates and outputs x ∈ {0, 1}np using equation (17).
25
A.3 Pictorial Evolution of Algorithms in This Paper
dbk
|pj〉
|ai〉
Figure 14: Circuit to implement IQP. The controlled-Z is controlled by dbk = Qij where j and i are the indices of the primary and ancillary
qubits. In other words dbk = 1 means the primary and ancillary qubits are to be entangled. This is the method described in Section 2.
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Figure 15: Circuit to implement IQP with additional intermediate qubit. This is the method described in Section 3.1. The gate at (a)
describes the process of generating the break and bridge qubit while those at (b) display the corrections necessary as a result of the bridge
and break process
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Figure 16: Circuit to implement IQP with additional intermediate qubit and randomness. This is the method used in Section 3.2. The dotted
box (c) indicates the preparation to be done by the Client while (d) indicates the corrections to be done. These corrections are Incorporated
into the measurements.
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